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Abstract. Active network technology enables fast deployment of new network
services tailored to the specific needs of end users, among other features.
Nevertheless, security is still a main concern when considering the industrial
adoption of this technology. In this article we describe an open security
architecture for active network platforms that follow the discrete approach. The
proposed solution provides all the required security features, and it also grants
proper scalability of the overall system, by using a distributed key-generation
algorithm. The performance of the proposal is validated with experimental data
obtained from a prototype implementation of the solution.
1. Introduction
Active networking technology[1] has already proven to be a powerful approach when
fast deployment of new protocols and services is needed. However, security risks
introduced by its own nature are a major concern when evaluating the usage of this
technology in public environments. Furthermore, heavy security measures can
preclude deployment in real scenarios because of the imposed overhead in terms of
processing, bandwidth and/or latency. So, in order to achieve a deployable active
network architecture, the security solution must not only provide protection from all
the detected threats but it must also grant the scalability of the system. In this article,
we will present ROSA, a Realistic Open Security Architecture for active network
platforms that follow the discrete approach [2], which can fulfill both requirements
thanks to a distributed key-generation algorithm and to architectural features of the
discrete approach platforms.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In section 2 an introduction to
discrete approach to active networks is presented. In section 3, the security solution
requirements are detailed, including threats assessment and scalability requirements.
Next, section 4 provides an overall description of the proposed security architecture.
In section 5, implementation is described and performance results are discussed.
Section 6 is dedicated to related works. Finally, section 7 is devoted to conclusions.
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2. Active Networks: The Discrete Approach
There are two different approaches to provide dynamic network programmability to
active networks. Some active network platforms follow a discrete approach. This
means, packets do not include the code to be executed in the Active Routers, but a
separate mechanism exists for injecting programs into an Active Router, such as a
Code Server. Other active network platforms follow an integrated approach, and
packets (called capsules) include not only user data but the code used for the
forwarding of the packet as well. We will next present three active networks that
follow the discrete approach: DAN, SARA and ASP. These platforms are compatible
with ROSA. Finally, we will describe the active packet exchange.
2.1. Discrete Approach Platforms
DAN[3], which stands for Distributed Code Caching for active networks, has been
developed by the Washington University of St Louis and by the Computer
Engineering and Network Laboratory of Zurich. DAN is an Execution Environment
(EE) that is running in the high performance Active Network Node, ANN [4]. The
proposed framework mainly includes the following components: an Active Module
Loader which loads the active modules authenticated and digitally signed by their
developers from well known code servers using a lightweight network protocol; a
Policy Controller which maintains a table of policy rules set up by an administrator; a
Security Gateway which allows/denies active modules based on their origin and
developer by analyzing their digital signatures/authentication information; a Function
Dispatcher which identifies references to active modules in data packets and passes
these packets to their corresponding function implementations; and a Resource
Controller for fair CPU time sharing among active functions.
The next active network platform considered is SARA (Simple Active Router
Assistant) [5] which is an active router prototype developed by the University Carlos
III de Madrid in the context of the IST project GCAP [6]. It is based on the router-
assistant paradigm, meaning that active code does not run directly on the router
processor but on a different device, called assistant, which is directly attached to the
router through a high-speed LAN. Hence, the router only has to identify and divert
active packets to its assistant. Active packets are identified by the router alert option,
enabling active router location transparency, since active packets need not be
addressed to the active router in order to be processed by it. After requested
processing is performed by the assistant, the packets are returned to the router in order
to be forwarded. The active code needed to process active packets is dynamically
downloaded from Code Servers when it is not locally available in the assistant. In this
way, safety can be checked in advance, since only registered code proved harmless is
stored in code servers. SARA is available in two platforms: One fully based on linux
[7] and a hybrid platform where the router used is an Ericsson-Telebit AXI462
running a kernel adapted to work with an active assistant.
Finally, we will consider one of the principal EEs running within ABone [8] which
is ASP [9] from the University of the Southern California/Information Sciences
Institute. In the implementation proposed in this EE, the active code is downloaded
        
from a set of known secure code servers. An important contribution of ASP is the
support of persistent active applications that may have long-lived execution threads.
2.2. Discrete Platform Packet Exchange
In order to present the security architecture, we will first introduce the packet
exchange performed, so we can detect the requirements imposed by security and
scalability concerns.
The elements involved in the packet exchange are:
Source: User terminal that generates traffic and uses the active services.
Destination: It is the terminal that Source addresses its traffic to.
Active Router: It is a router capable of processing active packets. It is also able to
obtain the active code needed.
Code Server: It is the active code repository that serves the Active Routers.
The packet exchange description depicted in figure 1 is described next. When Source
needs special active processing for a flow of packets between itself and Destination, it
must send packets (msg1), addressed to Destination, containing the identification of
the active code that it desires to be executed. When a packet reaches the first Active
Router, it is inspected and the identification of the active code is extracted. If the
active code is locally available at the Active Router, it performs the requested process
and then forwards the packet (msg4). If the needed active code is not locally available
the Active Router requests it from the Code Server (msg2). The Code Server then
sends the requested code to the Active Router (msg3), which now processes the packet
and forwards it to the next hop. The same procedure is executed by all the Active
Routers along the path (msg5, msg6), until the packet reaches Destination, where the
packet is received (msg7). Next active packets of this flow will presumably follow the
same path, so the Active Routers will be capable of processing them without needing
to request the code from Code Servers again.
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3. Security Architecture Requirements
In this section we will present the different requirements imposed on the security
architecture. We will first start by stating the security requirements and then we will
describe other general requirements, specially emphasizing the scalability aspects.
3.1. Security Requirements
Security requirements imposed by active networks have already been detailed in
several documents [10]. So, we will not perform an exhaustive analysis here, but we
will only present the final security requirements from each element´s perspective.
From the Active Router´s perspective, authorization is a key requirement. It is
relevant that the active code loaded into the routers is provided by an authorized Code
Server and not from an unauthorized source. In addition, the code integrity must be
preserved while it is transmitted from the Code Server to the Active Router. In
addition, the Active Router must be able to verify that the user that is requesting the
code (i.e. Source) is authorized to execute it at this moment.
From the Code Server´s perspective, it must be able to authen ticate Active Routers
that are requesting active code, since not all the code will be available to all routers.
Furthermore, the security solution must provide confidential code transfer, in order to
prevent unauthorized parties from inspecting the delivered code.
From the Source´s perspective, it must be able to be certain no other user is
requesting active services on its behalf. It must also be the only one capable of
controlling its active services, meaning that no other user is capable of introducing
new active packets or modifying active packets sent by Source, interfering with the
requested active service. In addition to authentication features, it is also important to
provide non-repudiation; this is specially important when active services will be
provided in a commercial fashion.
From the Destination´s perspective, there are no requirements since it does not
demand active services from the network. It should be noted that end-to-end security
is out of the scope of this security solution.
3.2. Other General Requirements
Besides security requirements, the security architecture must also meet scalability and
performance requirements, which are reflected next:
1. Zero user knowledge at the Active Routers: In order to build a manageable
solution, user management must not be performed on each and every Active
Router. A database containing all the users information, including access rights
would be the preferred solution.
2. Path transparency: It must not be required that the Source be aware of which Active
Routers are in the path used to transport packet towards the Destination. In
addition, it must not be required that each node in the path has knowledge of its
active neighbors. These requirements are needed to grant the scalability,
           
performance and flexibility of the active network, since, hop-by-hop authentication
is considered to be incapable of providing the mentioned features.
4. ROSA Security Architecture
In this section we will present the proposed security architecture. We will first
consider Source authorization issues, evaluating the different authorization paradigms
available and then infering which one is the most appropriate for this particular
problem. Then we will consider the code downloading security and non-repudiation
issues. Finally, we will present the overall solution step by step.
4.1. Source Authorization
4.1.1. Authorization Paradigm
A key feature that must be provided by the security architecture is authorization, i.e.
Sources must be authorized to execute the solicited code on Active Routers. There are
two authorization paradigms that can be used: authorization based on access control
lists or authorization based on credentials. The first paradigm is based on the
existence of an access control list (locally available or in a remote location) that must
be queried every time an Active Router receives an active packet sent by Source, in
order to validate the Source´s permissions. In this case the identity of the requesting
party must be authenticated in order to prevent impersonation. This approach then
requires that the requested device (Active Router) has information about Sources and
permissions, or it imposes a communication with an authorization server every time a
Source sends an active packet. The second paradigm demands that every time Source
sends a packet, a credential that proves the Source´s permissions must be presented.
Then the requested device (Active Router) only needs to verify the credential.
However, credential generation and distribution may be more than a trivial task.
The solution proposed in this paper will be designed based on the second
paradigm, since we consider that it provides better scalability attributes.
4.1.2. Considering the Usage of Public Key Cryptography
In order to allow the intended use, a credential must contain verifiable authorization
information, i.e. the permissions granted to the holder of the credential. In addition, it
must be possible to verify that the issuer of the credential is a Valid Issuer, i.e. that it
has the authority to grant these permissions. It is also critical to validate that the user
that is presenting the credential is the same user that the credential was granted to.
In order to fulfill the above stated characteristics of a credential, public key
encryption can be used. So, a credential containing the Source´s permission and the
Source´s public key is signed by the Valid Issuer. Then, the Active Router must be
capable of verifying the authenticity of the credential and also it must be capable of
verifying that the requesting user has the private key that corresponds to the public
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key included in the credential. This mechanism provides all the required features, but
the usage of public key cryptography is very demanding in terms of processing.
4.1.3. Authorization and Key Generation Solution
In order to obtain a less demanding solution, symmetric key cryptography can be
used. However, building a similar system using symmetric key would require the
usage of two different symmetric keys (a first one shared by the Valid Issuer and the
Active Routers and another key shared by Source and the Active Routers). This system
would still demand two cryptographic verifications and it would present the additional
problem of key distribution. So, in order to improve the scalability of the solution, we
will next explore the possibility of using only one symmetric key, shared by the Valid
Issuer, Source and the Active Routers.
The requirements imposed on this key are:
− Different keys for different Sources. (i.e. the key must be linked to a Source)
− Different keys for the same Source at different moments (i.e. key validity period)
− Different keys for different active codes requested by the same Source (i.e. the key
must be linked to an active code/active service)
Therefore, the key K issued by the Valid Issuer is linked to a Source, an active code
and a validity period.
Then, if K is used for generating an HMAC [11] included in active packets that
requests the execution of a particular active code, the active packets themselves play
the role of credentials. Basically, an Active Router receives an active packet that
includes the requested code identification, the Source identity, the time when the
active service was requested, the requested period and an HMAC. Then, if the Active
Router has a valid key K linked to the Source, the requested code identification and
the validity period, it can verify the authenticity of the active packet, without any
further information. This mechanism imposes the usage of an Authorization Server
(the Valid Issuer role), that generates the keys (K). So, in order to execute a code in
the network, Source must obtain the correspondent key (K) from the Authorization
Server in a secure way. This is not a time critical task, since it is only performed when
the service is requested and it is possible to be executed in advance. However, once
the service is authorized and the key K is generated, the Authorization Server must
communicate it to all Active Routers in the network, so they are aware of the new
authorization. This is not the most scalable solution, because of the amount of
communications needed between the Authorization Server and the Active Routers.
We will next present an improved solution that minimizes the required interactions.
The basic idea is that the key, K, can be almost autonomously generated in every
Active Router when it is needed. In order to achieve this, we will associate a key (Kci)
to every active code (Ci) that can be loaded in the Active Routers. These keys, Kci,
are known by the Code Server and by the Authorization Server. Then, when a Source,
S, requests authorization for the execution of code Ci at a moment T and for a period
P, the Authorization Server generates the secret key K as the HMAC of the
concatenation of the parameters Kci, S, T, P and Ci.
K = HMAC(Kci, S, T, P, Ci)
        
The key K is then transmitted to the Source, so it can generate the HMAC that will
be included in active packets with it. If we analyze the characteristics of K we can see
that: K is linked to an active code (Ci, Kci); K is linked to a Source (S); K has a
validity period (T, T+P); K can not be generated by the Source, since it does not have
Kci. In addition, the Code Server can attach Kci to the active code when this is
confidentially downloaded to the Active Routers. So, the Active Routers are capable of
regenerating K without contacting the Authorization Server every time an active
packet arrives or when a new Source requests an already downloaded code. The
Active Routers have all the information needed to generate K, i.e. S, T, P and Ci are
included in all active packets and Kci is obtained when they download the code from
de Code Server.
Note that since the solution is based on shared secret keys, the security level of the
solution can be defined by setting the number of parties that share the Kci keys
(authorized Active Routers for a given code Ci) and the frequency with which Kci
keys are changed. A re-keying procedure based on the usage of multiple overlapped
keys has been defined, which can be easily tuned to obtain the requested security
level. It should also be noted that, since Kci are stored in routers, it is assumed that
routers have some form of secure storage capabilities.
4.2. Code Downloading
Another key feature that must also be provided is a secure way to download code (and
Kci keys) from the Code Server into the Active Routers. However, this is not as time
critical as user authorization since it is only performed once, when the first packet
arrives to an Active Router. The subsequent packets will benefit from a cached copy
of the code and the Kci. So, a protocol that allows a secure communication between
two parties is needed. We will use TLS [12] since it provides all the needed features.
Then both Code Server and Active router must have a digital certificate (public key
cryptography is used), and a TLS session is established between the Code Server and
the Active Router, before the code is downloaded.
4.3. Non-repudiation
When the user is requesting a service, commercial and legal issues may be involved,
so non-repudiation is relevant. Furthermore, the security architecture can be used to
enable charging mechanisms. In this case non-repudiation is considered as an
important asset. In order to assure non-repudiation, public key cryptography must be
used when the user requests authorization to the Authorization Server, as will be
described in the following section.
4.4. The Security Solution: Step by Step
In this section we will describe the complete mechanism, illustrated in figure 2. First
(step 1 in figure 2), the Source requests authorization (to the Authorization Server) to
execute an active code Ci in the network (getting an active service). This request is
ROSA: Realistic Open Security Architecture for Active Networks           
done in a secure way, meaning that public key cryptography and digital certificates
are used by both parties. Therefore, Source´s request is signed with the private key of
Source and its digital certificate is also included. This request is encrypted with the
public key of the Authorization Server. Then the Authorization Server after receiving
and verifying the request, it generates K as the HMAC of the Source´s identification
(S), the requested codes identification (Ci), the key associated to this code (Kci), the
service request time (T) and the validity period requested by Source (P), as we
presented in section 4.1.3. Then, the Authorization Server sends a signed message
containing K. The message is encrypted with the public key of Source.
The Source decrypts the message and obtains K. Then (step 2 in figure 2), it
generates active packets, that include its own identification S, the service request time
T, the validity period P and an identifier of the requested active code Ci. This message
includes an HMAC of the message using K.
ActivePacket = (Ci, S, T, P, Payload, hmacK[Ci, S, T, P, Payload])
When an Active Router receives the message, it first verifies that the message is not
obsolete, i.e. it is within the validity period, and then it verifies the solicited active
code availability. In case the code (and Kci) is not locally available, it downloads it,
using a secure (TLS) connection from the Code Server (step 3 in figure 2). Then the
Active Router generates K, using Ci, S, T and P extracted from the active packet and
Kci obtained from the Code Server when the code was downloaded. If the HMAC is
verified, it means that Source has been authorized to execute the requested code, so
the Active Router processes the packet using the requested code and forwards it to the
next hop. The same procedure is repeated on every Active Router along the path until
the packet reaches Destination. The subsequent active packets of the flow will benefit
from cached copies of the active code and Kci in every Active Router. It must be
noted that the presented solution is limited to one security domain, i.e. one
Authorization Server providing keys. It is possible to extend the solution to multiple
domains, but this is more than a trivial task and it will be presented in future works.
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5. Implementation and Tests
In order to evaluate the viability of ROSA, the security architecture has been
implemented and its influence on the end-to-end delay has been measured. Two main
processes have been evaluated: active packets protection and secure active code
downloads. We have not considered the service request phase, because it has a similar
cost to a code download and it is only executed once. In order to enable a simple
integration of the developed prototype with available active network platforms, this
implementation has been developed in Java, even though we are fully aware of the
performance penalty of this choice.
5.1. Active Packets Protection Cost
In ROSA, active packets protection is provided by HMAC, so performance of HMAC
Java implementation has been measured. Tests have been done using a PIII 1.1Ghz,
256MB, Linux Kernel 2.4.17 and JSKD 1.4.0. We have measured the time needed for
performing an HMAC and its verification. Two different algorithms were considered,
MD5 and SHA1, and the data block size ranged from 0 to 64KB. The results are that
HMAC delay is between 0.38 ms and 4.55 ms.
5.2. Secure Code Downloads Cost
The test-bed used for this set of trials is as follows: a PIII-600 MHz, 64MB has been
used as Active Router and a PIII-1.1GHz, 256MB has been used as Code Server; both
systems have been directly connected via a Fast-Ethernet. The Code Server is a web
server Apache v.1.3.24 with the SSL module. The code has been downloaded opening
a TLS connection inside a previously established TLS session between the Code
Server and the Active Router. The delay of the code download has been measured for
non-secure connections (http) and secure connections (https). Different code sizes
(from 1KB to 16 KB) have been used in the tests. The obtained delay is 3-5ms for
http and 32-37 ms for https. In our scenario, the Code Server and the Active Router
will be in the same domain so we estimate an additional delay of 10ms, which would
be the mean delay introduced by 3 hops. Hence, for instance the estimated delay for
2KB code size would be 14 ms for http and 42 ms for https.
5.3. Security Cost of an End-to-End Typical Communication
In this section, we will evaluate the cost of providing security to the active network
inside a typical Internet scenario, composed of 15 routers, four of which are Active
Routers, with an average end-to-end delay of 60ms1. We will state the following
additional suppositions: average packet size 512B; average active code size 2KB and
all Active Routers modify active packets (so they must compute HMAC twice, one
time to verify the received packet and another time to send the packet). Obviously, the
active packet modification delay will be the same for the secure or non-secure
solution, and therefore it will not be considered in the end-to-end delay.
                                                          
1 Data obtained from http://www.caida.org.
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 In a non-secure scenario (NON-SECURE/CD in figure 3), the first active packet
suffers a delay of 116ms (60ms end-to-end delay plus 4*14ms for code download).
Note that the final CD indicates that this packet has led each Active Router to do a
code download. In the ROSA scenario with code download (ROSA/CD in figure 3),
delay increases to 234.4ms because of: https code download (4*42ms), key generation
in Active Routers (4*0.46ms), HMAC in Active Routers, Source and Destination
(10*0.46ms).
Next, we will analyze the cost when the active code is already in the Active
Routers, which will be the situation in most cases . The delay introduced by ROSA is
of 4.6ms (from 60ms in NON-SECURE solution to 64.6ms) because of the HMAC
processed in Active Routers, Source and Destination.
The results show that ROSA introduces a small increase to the non-secure end-to-
end delay (7.6%) in most cases, i.e. when code downloads are not needed. Only the
first active packet of the session experiences a higher delay. We conclude that the
delay introduced by ROSA is reasonable and the proposed architecture is feasible.
6. Related Work
In this section, we will perform a comparative analysis of the proposed solution,
ROSA, and other security architectures proposed for other platforms. In particular, we
will study the security solutions presented for ANTS, DAN and SANE.
ANTS [13] and ASP are the two main EEs running on Abone. ASP specification
does not define a security architecture but SANTS [15] is an ANSA based proposal
for ANTS. ANSA is an Active Network Security Architecture (ANSA) [14] proposed
by the research community to be used in Abone [16]. ANSA uses symmetric key
techniques over the variable part of the packet [17], in order to provide inter-node
protection, and digital signature over the fixed part of the packet, to provide
authentication and authorization of the principal. In ROSA we avoid asymmetric key
with the purpose of improving the performance. That is possible because we do not
need the non-repudiation service over the active packets flow, since we provide it
during service request. Furthermore, since a topology independent solution is
required, the mechanism to share the keys based on the neighboring relationship
Figure 3. Comparison of end-to-end delay.











           
proposed in the ANSA based EEs [15] is not acceptable. ROSA proposes a more
sophisticated key distribution mechanism between the trusted components of SARA.
In DAN the security issues are addressed through policy and cryptography. The
security problem is reduced to the implementation of a simple policy rule on the node
which lets it choose the right code server and a database of public keys to check the
developers signature of the plug-in and the code servers authentication. DAN simply
does not address additional security issues considered in the design of ROSA.
SANE [18] is a layered architecture developed in the University of Pennsylvania.
The lower layer of the architecture use a secure bootstrap mechanism called AEGIS
[19] that ensures that the system starts in an expected and safe state. SANE allows
users to run their own modules on active nodes. In order to ensure the proper usage of
network resources, it authenticates and authorizes requesting users through the usage
of a modified version of the Station To Station protocol (STS) [20] between the user
and each active node along the path that packets will follow. Once the STS protocol
has concluded, and a security association is established between the user and each
active node, the user´s packets can be authenticated. This scheme imposes the usage
of a different authenticator for each active node in the path, which must be carried in
each active packet. The proposed solution for this issue is that a common secret key is
distributed among every active node using the established security association. The
main drawback detected is the time needed for path establishment, since a STS
exchange and a secret key exchange are needed. Moreover, when the path changes,
these operations must be performed over the new path. ROSA has a reduced path
establishment time since only one key exchange (with the Code Server) is needed.
7. Conclusions
We have presented a security solution for active network platforms that follow the
discrete approach. Key features of the solution include: The solution performance is
guaranteed by the usage of symmetric key cryptography. The scalability of the
solution is assured by the authorization model, based on credentials, and the key
distribution mechanism, that minimizes key exchanges by allowing key generation at
every Active Router in an autonomous fashion. The security level of the solution is
determined by the re-keying frequency i.e. how often Kci keys are changed. Essential
features of the solution such as performance and scalability have been validated with
measures obtained from a prototype implementation of the solution. Furthermore, it
must be stressed that the proposed architecture is open since it is valid for any active
network platform as long it follows the discrete approach using a Code Server.
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